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dc.creatorKambhampati, Ashwin
dc.creatorSegura-Rodríguez, Carlos Luis
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-24T18:46:20Z
dc.date.available2021-02-24T18:46:20Z
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorioinvestigaciones.bccr.fi.cr/handle/20.500.12506/345
dc.descriptionHow does a profit-maximizing manager form teams and compensate workers in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard? Under complete information, it is well known that any complementarity in characteristics implies that positive assortative matching is productively efficient. But, under asymmetric information, we uncover the problem of disassortative incentives: incentive costs may increase in assortativity. Profit maximization thus prescribes either random or negative assortative matching, both productively inefficient, when complementarities are weak and effort costs are high enough. When this is the case, the manager may instead prefer to delegate matching, allowing workers to sort themselves into teams. Our results shed light on recent empirical work documenting patterns of non-assortative matching inside of firms.
dc.description.abstractHow does a profit-maximizing manager form teams and compensate workers in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard? Under complete information, it is well known that any complementarity in characteristics implies that positive assortative matching is productively efficient. But, under asymmetric information, we uncover the problem of disassortative incentives: incentive costs may increase in assortativity. Profit maximization thus prescribes either random or negative assortative matching, both productively inefficient, when complementarities are weak and effort costs are high enough. When this is the case, the manager may instead prefer to delegate matching, allowing workers to sort themselves into teams. Our results shed light on recent empirical work documenting patterns of non-assortative matching inside of firms.
dc.format.extent61 páginas: gráficas, cuadros
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherBanco Central de Costa Rica
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
dc.subjectInformacion asimetrica
dc.subjectDelegación
dc.subjectEquipos
dc.titleThe Optimal Assortativity of Teams Inside the Firm
dc.title.alternativeThe Optimal Assortativity of Teams Inside the Firm
dc.typeWorking paper
dc.rights.ccAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional
dc.rights.accessRightsOpen Access
dc.subject.jelC78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
dc.subject.jelD86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
dc.subject.jelL23 - Organization of Production
dc.subject.jelspaC78 - Teoría de la negociación; Teoría de la confrontación
dc.subject.jelspaD86 - Economía de los contratos: teoría
dc.subject.jelspaL23 - Organización de la producción
dc.subject.keywordAsymmetric Information
dc.subject.keywordAssortative Matching
dc.subject.keywordDelegation
dc.subject.keywordTeams
dc.rights.spaAcceso abierto
dc.type.spaDocumentos de trabajo
dc.type.hasversionPublished version
dc.audienceResearchers
dc.audienceStudents
dc.audienceTeachers
dc.audiencePolicymakers


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