The Optimal Assortativity of Teams Inside the Firm

Kambhampati, Ashwin; Segura-Rodríguez, Carlos Luis

The Optimal Assortativity of Teams Inside the Firm

dc.audience	Researchers	es_ES
dc.audience	Students	es_ES
dc.audience	Teachers	es_ES
dc.audience	Policymakers	es_ES
dc.creator	Kambhampati, Ashwin
dc.creator	Segura-Rodríguez, Carlos Luis
dc.date.accessioned	2021-02-24T18:46:20Z
dc.date.available	2021-02-24T18:46:20Z
dc.description	How does a profit-maximizing manager form teams and compensate workers in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard? Under complete information, it is well known that any complementarity in characteristics implies that positive assortative matching is productively efficient. But, under asymmetric information, we uncover the problem of disassortative incentives: incentive costs may increase in assortativity. Profit maximization thus prescribes either random or negative assortative matching, both productively inefficient, when complementarities are weak and effort costs are high enough. When this is the case, the manager may instead prefer to delegate matching, allowing workers to sort themselves into teams. Our results shed light on recent empirical work documenting patterns of non-assortative matching inside of firms.	es_ES
dc.description.abstract	How does a profit-maximizing manager form teams and compensate workers in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard? Under complete information, it is well known that any complementarity in characteristics implies that positive assortative matching is productively efficient. But, under asymmetric information, we uncover the problem of disassortative incentives: incentive costs may increase in assortativity. Profit maximization thus prescribes either random or negative assortative matching, both productively inefficient, when complementarities are weak and effort costs are high enough. When this is the case, the manager may instead prefer to delegate matching, allowing workers to sort themselves into teams. Our results shed light on recent empirical work documenting patterns of non-assortative matching inside of firms.	es_ES
dc.format.extent	61 páginas: gráficas, cuadros	es_ES
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf	es_ES
dc.identifier.uri	https://repositorioinvestigaciones.bccr.fi.cr/handle/20.500.12506/345
dc.language.iso	eng	es_ES
dc.publisher	Banco Central de Costa Rica	es_ES
dc.rights.accessRights	Open Access	es_ES
dc.rights.cc	Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 Internacional	*
dc.rights.spa	Acceso abierto	es_ES
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/	*
dc.subject	Informacion asimetrica	es_ES
dc.subject	Delegación	es_ES
dc.subject	Equipos	es_ES
dc.subject.jel	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory	es_ES
dc.subject.jel	D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory	es_ES
dc.subject.jel	L23 - Organization of Production	es_ES
dc.subject.jelspa	C78 - Teoría de la negociación; Teoría de la confrontación	es_ES
dc.subject.jelspa	D86 - Economía de los contratos: teoría	es_ES
dc.subject.jelspa	L23 - Organización de la producción	es_ES
dc.subject.keyword	Asymmetric Information	es_ES
dc.subject.keyword	Assortative Matching	es_ES
dc.subject.keyword	Delegation	es_ES
dc.subject.keyword	Teams	es_ES
dc.title	The Optimal Assortativity of Teams Inside the Firm	es_ES
dc.title.alternative	The Optimal Assortativity of Teams Inside the Firm	es_ES
dc.type	Working paper	es_ES
dc.type.hasversion	Published version	es_ES
dc.type.spa	Documentos de trabajo	es_ES

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