2021-02-242021-02-24https://repositorioinvestigaciones.bccr.fi.cr/handle/20.500.12506/345How does a profit-maximizing manager form teams and compensate workers in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard? Under complete information, it is well known that any complementarity in characteristics implies that positive assortative matching is productively efficient. But, under asymmetric information, we uncover the problem of disassortative incentives: incentive costs may increase in assortativity. Profit maximization thus prescribes either random or negative assortative matching, both productively inefficient, when complementarities are weak and effort costs are high enough. When this is the case, the manager may instead prefer to delegate matching, allowing workers to sort themselves into teams. Our results shed light on recent empirical work documenting patterns of non-assortative matching inside of firms.How does a profit-maximizing manager form teams and compensate workers in the presence of both adverse selection and moral hazard? Under complete information, it is well known that any complementarity in characteristics implies that positive assortative matching is productively efficient. But, under asymmetric information, we uncover the problem of disassortative incentives: incentive costs may increase in assortativity. Profit maximization thus prescribes either random or negative assortative matching, both productively inefficient, when complementarities are weak and effort costs are high enough. When this is the case, the manager may instead prefer to delegate matching, allowing workers to sort themselves into teams. Our results shed light on recent empirical work documenting patterns of non-assortative matching inside of firms.61 páginas: gráficas, cuadrosapplication/pdfengInformacion asimetricaDelegaciónEquiposWorking paperAtribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0 InternacionalOpen AccessC78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching TheoryD86 - Economics of Contract: TheoryL23 - Organization of ProductionC78 - Teoría de la negociación; Teoría de la confrontaciónD86 - Economía de los contratos: teoríaL23 - Organización de la producciónAsymmetric InformationAssortative MatchingDelegationTeamsAcceso abierto